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Is Innovation a sound justification for Medical Patents? 
 
By Dara Tuncel 
|Preamble| 
 
| This essay will interrogate the legality of medical patents, arguing that one ought 
to reject the traditional utilitarian framework often used to justify IP law. Instead, 
this essay will turn to a more deontological justification for IP rights in UK law. | 
 
While normal patents already come under much scrutiny on account of having 
quite restrictive effects on the market, medical patents are highly controversial 
and easy targets because of their perceived ability to directly harm someone’s 
right to life by gatekeeping life-saving medicine. Since the start of the AIDS 
epidemic there has been a particularly harsh backlash against the existence of 
medical patents, with some companies even voluntarily giving away required 
medication to poorer countries. With the advent of COVID-19, and the 
international rush of countries vying to secure distribution rights for a viable 
vaccine produced by private sector companies, it seems an especially prudent 
time to consider the validity and justification behind drug patents in the United 
Kingdom. This essay will critically analyse the argument that drug patents 
encourage innovation and are a net benefit to society. This argument is strong 
on two counts; it not only is within the spirit of historical and contemporary 
intellectual property law in the UK and EU, but it also is an argument that 
especially fits the field of medical IP law.  
This investigation will be composed of two parts. First it will go over the 
theoretical and empirical grounding behind the justification of medical 
patents. Before anything else it is essential to argue and prove that it is justified 
to give companies who develop new medicines almost monopolistic rights over 
the invention for a relatively long period of time. For the sake of brevity, it will 
analyse this through a utilitarian point of view. Second, it will then describe 
some key landmarks in British IP law and show how our argument is within 
the spirit of this legislation.  
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The first modern patent legislations worth mentioning – following the ‘Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883)’, which defines the 
types of most commonly used patent protections as ‘Collective Marks’: 
Industrial Designs, Trade Names, Indications of Source, and Unfair 
Competition1 – are the ‘Patents and Designs Act (Hansard) 1919’ (succeeding 
the ‘Patents and Designs Act, 1907/Principal Act’), and the ‘Patents Act 1949’. 
The 1919 Act, among other things, gave a sixteen-year monopoly to patents and 
allowed for the granting of compulsory licenses three years after the granting 
of the patent. For the time this was not an uncommon part of patent legislation. 
This was exacerbated by the 1949 act which, with sections 41 and 46, allowed 
for a compulsory license immediately after the granting of a patent on behalf 
of or in service of any Government department and any person authorised in 
writing by the British Crown2. Furthermore, sections 14 and 33 allowed for 
opposition to the granting of a patent and the ability to seek its revocation. The 
suggested grounds for opposing a patent; “Lack of novelty, prior publication 
and ambiguous or imprecise specification”.3 The reason for these 
specifications is clear. The act, though it may have unintentionally harmed 
innovation through the compulsory license clauses, still suggested that patents 
were meant to be “novel” and innovate. Similarly, the 1977 Patents Act shows 
some ways in which innovation is valued as an important part of patenting. 
Section ‘1(1) of the act includes two interesting requirements for the granting 
of a patent: “a) The invention is new; b) it involves an inventive step”. 
Furthermore, Section ‘1 (2) a)’ prohibits the patenting of a “discovery, scientific 
theory or mathematical method”4. One example of this is that though methods 
of identifying an illness are not patentable if done through the human body, a 
company can still patent in vitro determination of laboratory parameters. 
Furthermore, EPO case law later establishes, in a different interpretation, that 
‘“diagnostic methods practices on the human body” should not be considered 
to relate only to methods containing all the steps involved in reaching a 
 
1 World Intellectual Property Organization, Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property (1883) 
2 Legislation.Gov, “Patents Act 1949” < https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6/12-13-
14/87/contents>  
3 Slin, Patents and the UK Pharmaceutical industry between 1945 and the 1970s, page.194 
4 Legislation. Gov, “Patents Act 1977” < https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1977/37/section/1>  
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medical diagnosis, but to all methods practised on the human body which 
related to diagnosis or were of value for the purpose of diagnosis’ (EPO TBoA 
T964/99, 2001, Cygnus), the caveat being that if one step had diagnostic 
importance and ‘essential’, then the procedure would be exempt from 
patenting5. According to recent estimates, patents were granted, or 
applications filed for almost 20% of human genetic data, including data for 
monogenic disorders such as Cystic fibrosis, and more common predisposition 
genes such as breast cancer6. In summary, the current medical patents 
legislation ensures that patents are first and foremost innovative inventions – 
not discoveries – which deserve special protection. In the case of legislating 
and patenting medicine, it is clear novel drugs meet the criteria and spirit of 
the act. Novel drugs aren’t simply new discoveries of existing product but are 
entirely new creations that required large quantities of capital and work to 
invent. 
Novel techniques of medical practice and research should be delicately 
assessed to measure their quality and effectiveness prior to acceptance for 
clinical application. The Utilitarian Framework – or the ‘egalitarian principle’ 
– argues that for a practice (or law) to be ‘good’, it must produce the maximum 
amount of happiness and prosperity for all people. In the case of medical 
patents, utilitarianism promotes a systems of rewarding heath care 
innovations vis-à-vis the possibilities of the public health care system7. This 
can, however, encourage the suggestion that medical patents are unjustified 
because the monetary reward received by companies for Research and 
Development (R&D) does not weigh-equally – in the sense of health-
economical calculations –  with the potential lives saved through either an 
insurance-cap based healthcare or free access to medicine via national tax-
based subsidies. Utilitarianism, in this context, is not just a philosophical 
framework but also an economic and political one. Thus, understanding the 
true purpose of utilitarianism in the medical context is critical to determining 
whether current laws are acceptable, fulfil and go beyond historic ambitions. 
 
5 Van Overwalle, IPR Issues and High Quality Genetic Testing, p256  
6 Soini (et.al) Patenting and licensing in genetic testing: ethical, legal and social issues, p10 
7 Ibid, p34 
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This is a primarily pragmatic framework, accepting that even if an act may 
result in some negative socio-economic consequences, patents applied to 
secure diagnostic tests – for example – can ensure that patients get tested, for 
prenatal or predictive purposes, and either received ‘negative’ outcomes – 
where the fear of disease is quelled – or ‘positive’ outcomes – where although 
a persons’ outlook may be bleaker, there is hope in resolving the affliction 
thanks to early treatment. Thus, an advantage of the medical patent system is 
the guarantee of ‘cyclical’ development, unhindered by uncertain, or 
uncontrollable, business-motivated competition8. With this in mind, one sees 
the main counter argument in defence of medical patents: medical patents are 
acceptable as they allow for more lives to be saved in the long run than if they 
were to not exist. 
Technological – and consequently theoretical – innovation is an integral 
incentive for companies to invest in new technology and to share this 
information publicly. For instance, if a company could choose to either spend 
a large quantity of capital to try and invent some new product or could copy 
from a less-capable competitor with sure success, the latter would always be 
wiser without the existence of patents. The company would be incentivised to 
hoard capital until it saw some blossoming new invention which it could take 
and better produce with its greater manufacturing capacity. With patent law, 
the company would be forced to at least buy out the owners of the patent, which 
would still encourage innovation in a roundabout manner – in the context of 
this paper, furthering the ‘cyclicality’ of medical patents. This argument is 
supported largely due to the high cost of capital that is required to constantly 
innovate in the healthcare industry. While estimates have varied, one source 
puts the mean investment required to bring a new drug to market at about $1.3 
billion.9 There are several important factors requiring the investment to be so 
expensive. First, new medicines have very lengthy R&D processes as well as 
difficult clinical trials. Additionally, many clinical trials fail and require new 
research and development for medicines. Consequently, it is important to 
 
8 Ibid, p35 
9 Wouters (et.al). Estimated Research and Development Investment Needed to Bring a New Medicine 
to Market, 2009-2018, pp.844–853.  
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create adequate monetary and moral incentives for innovation in the medical 
industry. Although companies may sometimes develop diagnostic tests 
without appropriate patent coverage, these sorts of tests are only done for basic 
experiments that have either a very low or decidedly scientifically unknown 
projected outcome. In some circumstances, companies may be excluded from 
entering relevant pharmaceutical markets if they do not provide the adequate 
incentives, and subsequently protections, for their R&D funding 
applications10. Despite the obvious mechanisms attempting to provide rigidity 
to the medical patents sector, drug manufacturers are increasingly ‘anti-
generic medication’ – what this means is that companies are resulting to a 
number of tactics to undermine the ‘1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act’, which gave pharmaceuticals exclusive protection rights 
as a result of new drug innovations. Companies who successfully developed 
new therapies through the 1984 Act were well placed to assert monopolies on 
the markets, however, this was offset by an aggressive expiration schedule 
which encouraged any and all drug companies to manufacture non-brand 
name versions as “generics”11. Two common ways pharmaceuticals are 
undermining the widespread accessibility to generics are “pay for delay” 
agreements (where companies pay generic manufacturers to not release 
drugs), and “Citizens petitions” (where applications can be made, by 
corporations, to authorities such as the American FDA to deny or delay 
approvals of generics)12. The jeopardization of “generics” reflects a 
pharmaceutical industry allowing monopolies to run rampant – it runs counter 
to the ‘cyclicality’, the ideology behind the patent system itself: increased 
prosperity for inventors due to market monopoly realisation, enhanced 
reputations, recovered R&D costs and increased welfare prosperity for those 
chiefly benefitting from their inventions13. Under the Utilitarian framework, it 
seems best to create laws that would save the most amount of people over the 
longest period of time. Forcing pharmaceuticals to innovate in line with the 
practices established through the 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent 
 
10 Soini (et.a), Patenting and licensing in genetic testing, p.35 
11 Fox, How Pharma Companies game the System to Keep Drugs Expensive 
12 Ibid 
13 Gubby, Is the Patent System a Barrier to Inclusive Prosperity? The Biomedical Perspective  
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Term Restoration Act would likely be more beneficial than dismantling long-
standing patent laws, leading to one-time injections of cheaper medicine into 
the market and subsequent ‘free-flows’ of less certifiable products.   
While the theoretical argument is grounded in legislation and ideology of 
‘common-good’ regulation, further broader study in empirical data is required 
to better contextualise the problems of medical patent reforms. According to 
data gathered by Brownyn H. Hall and Dietmar Harhoff in their 2012 study, 
healthcare is actually one of the few industries where the argument for 
utilitarian reform of patent rights is shown to be accurate, and desirable. It is 
generally recognised that the pharmaceutical industry is one of the few parts 
of the economy which sees a tangible increase in innovation due to patent 
rights.14 Furthermore, one study, detailed by Duncan S. Gilchrist in his 2016 
work, examined the effect of “First-in-Class Exclusivity” in the USA to 
determine how they impact subsequent production of drugs by medical 
companies.15 There are two interesting takeaways from this study: First, it is 
suggested that an extra year of exclusivity and protection could lead to the 
subsequent net production of 25-30% subsequent entry, or 0.2 units/more 
drugs. From this, it is also implied that a standard deviation change (i.e. about 
3 years) in the exclusivity period could have drastic effects on drug innovation. 
An exclusivity period one standard deviation shorter is expected to lead to 0 in 
the average class, and an increase by one standard deviation is expected to 
double the number of subsequent entries. It might be pointed out that this is 
not a direct measure of innovation. For instance, it could be the case that this 
is merely showing the introduction of small “updates” to existing drugs which 
warrants the renewal of a patent. While scepticism is appreciated, this is a 
difficult argument to prove or disprove. It is still useful to prove that good 
patent protection can show an increase in drug production, whereas bad 
protection can show a decrease in production. 
An important part of this increase in production is the fact that new medicines 
require high research and development costs. This, in turn, requires strong 
patent rights in order for the product to be profitable. To view it in another 
 
14 Hall and Harhoff, Recent Research on the Economics of Patents, pp548-9 
15Gilchrist, Patents as a Spur to Subsequent Innovation? Evidence from Pharmaceuticals, pp.189-221 
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way, it seems that we can use research and development as a sign of innovation 
in the medical field. Indeed, if we follow the literature, this is another benefit 
of strong patent rights. Sunil Kanwar and Robert Everson, in their 2003 study, 
used cross-country data to examine the relationship between strong patent 
rights and levels of research and development.16  They argued that based on 
their data, a strong set of patent rights led to a direct increase in research and 
development spending. In fact, they even argue that the link could be stronger, 
had they been more careful in separating countries which only had strong 
rights De Jure and countries which had strong rights De Facto. Albert G.Z Hu 
and I.P. L Png expand on this idea, in their 2013 study, by instead examining 
the effect of IP law on economic growth.17 While they argued that strong IP 
rights could contribute to increased economic growth, they also advocate for a 
more nuanced view. It is argued that IP rights are most valuable for highly 
developed countries with particularly manufacture-focused economies. In 
particular it was important for countries with large patent-intensive industries 
(such as drug development). These two articles further advocate the benefits 
of a theoretical, utilitarian-minded approach to medical patents. While the 
Evenson article proves the beneficial effect of strong patent law on research 
and development, the Hu study shows that good IP law is essential for the 
strong economic growth of patent-intensive industries like the medical sector. 
Returning to the “generic” drugs problem, this highlights the longstanding 
‘balancing’ problem between monetary and moral incentives – it would be 
beneficial to explore more empirical examples of where this problem has 
exacerbated the issues of accessibility to the drugs themselves, and 
compromised the desired ‘cyclicality’ of medical patents. Such is traditionally 
called the “free-rider” problem: wherein companies which have not had to bear 
high research and development costs can take inventions and sell them for 
cheap, while profiting since they don’t have to make up for earlier research 
costs. James Bessen, et.al, collect a variety of data in their  2011 study, to 
emphasise how especially problematic this imbalance is in the medical 
 
16 Kanwar and Evenson, Does Intellectual Property Protection Spur Technological Change, pp. 235-
264 
17 Hu and Png, Patent Rights and Economic Growth: Evidence from Cross-country Panels of 
Manufacturing Industries pp.675-698 
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industry.18  First it has been proved that two years after generic alternatives 
have entered prices drop to 37% of original value. This is perhaps why there is 
such a discrepancy in patent pursuits between medical companies and other 
sectors - as they suggest, firms applied for patents on 79% of pharmaceutical 
products as opposed to 36% of product innovations and 25% of process 
innovations. This seems to align with other research into this field. For 
instance, one paper suggested that a patent could cause a 40-50% increase in 
the returns of an invention.19 With this in mind it should be easy to see why 
strong patent rights are important to the continued innovation and growth of 
a pharmaceutical company. In fact, there is even good reason to believe that 
weaker patent rights, on top of curbing innovation, could lessen access to 
important medicine. An analysis by Peter M. Cockburn, et.al, of this trend 
covers the launches of 642 new drugs across more than 70 countries. The 2016 
paper argues that on-top of the ordinary costs of new drugs, every country’s 
sale application has its own set of necessary and expensive costs, which puts 
even more pressure on drug companies to increase revenue. It is part of this 
which puts so much importance on patents and strong IP rights. It is then 
argued the best way to increase the diffusion and access to important drugs is 
to create long-lasting and strong IP rights.20 While the UK currently does not 
have to worry about gaining access to important drugs – thanks in large part 
to the National Health Services platform and robust maintenance of it – it is 
very likely that substantial changes in current IP/Patent laws – were they to 
provide weaker and shortened protective durations – would only serve to harm 
access to new medicine. 
In closing, perhaps more important than extrapolating the theoretical, 
utilitarian, model’s integrity is analysing whether UK legislation actually 
follows this justification for medical patents. It’s important to recognise that 
medical patents already have a long (and controversial) history in UK 
legislation. The first recorded patent for medical remedy in England was 
introduced by John Dickson in 1620, and relates to “certain commodious 
 
18 Bessen and Meurer, Do Patents Perform Like Property? p15 
19 Jensen (et.al) Estimating the Patent Premium; Evidence from the Australian Inventor Survey, 
pp.1128-1138 
20 Cockburn (et.al) Patents and the Global Diffusion of New Drugs, pp. 136-164 
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instrument called a back stall, back franie, or back skreene, for the ease and 
re liefe of such sick persons and others as are, or shall be, distempered or 
troubled with heate of theire backes through continual keeping or lye ing on 
theire beddes. ". In 1726 we can see Benjamin Okell’s “Doctor Bateman’s 
Pectoral drops”.21  These examples are brought up, not because they prove a 
link between the theoretical model but because they point to a continued 
tradition in our legal system of patenting medical inventions. This tradition 
has faced criticism long before the modern criticisms of expensive medicines. 
In the 1930s there was a great atmosphere of debate in the medical community 
over the ethics of patenting medicine. At its height ‘The Conference of Medical 
Patents’ (made up of representatives from the Royal Colleges of Physicians and 
Surgeons and the Medical Research Council) declared that “the granting of 
further patents in the medical field is undesirable in the public interest”. The 
reason given is that patents hinder research and discovery.22 Interestingly, an 
exception was created for “synthetic preparation of new substances”.23 This 
distinction is suggested to be based on the difference between the two 
categories of therapeutics. While patenting the use of biological material (e.g. 
vitamins, toxins, viruses) was seen to decrease innovation in the field, it was 
admitted (with German labs being used as an example) that synthetic patents 
could actually foster progress in the medical community.24 This isn’t strictly a 
legal source however the arguments being used align not only with our 
theoretical model but with the legislative model of the modern UK.  
To conclude, it seems that medical patents in their current form provide 
sufficient benefit to jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom. Theoretical 
arguments, advocating a more utilitarian, fair and crucially ‘cyclical’ model of 
regulating medical patents, are well-evidenced by historic problems with 
balancing monetary and moral obligations of inventors and pharmaceutical 
corporations in accordance with ‘fair’ legislative precedents on what 
constitutes a ‘patent’ within the context of multilateral and the medical sectors. 
 
21 “Early Medical Patents” The British Medical Journal, Vol. 2, No. 667; 1873 
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While pharmaceutical market price-regulations are in some jurisdictions – like 
the United States of America – offering outdated security or unfairly expensive 
to the chief consumers of the sector’s products because of longstanding 
industry manipulation and exploitation, it is difficult to argue that they are 
unjustifiably utilitous or that this is a good enough reason to dismantle patent 
rights altogether. One preferable solution would be for major countries to 
subsidise the production of important medicines while also unifying global 
standards for drug testing, similar to the precedents established in the ‘1984 
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act’. Though this 
wouldn’t completely solve the price issue, it would dramatically decrease the 
price of medicines by putting a time-cap on monopolies and reintroduce true 
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